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Abstract
This paper presents empirical results on matching process in the labour 
market in Marseilles (France). Using a sample of meetings, organized by the 
National Agency for Unemployment, between employers and workers we observe a 
selection among applicants on the basis of their level of education. The 
strength of this selection is the consequence of a channel effect caused by 
the poor quality of the screening performed by the agency. Employers appear 
also to discriminate against women, the youngest applicants, long term 
unemployed people and those of North-African extraction. These effects are 
alleviated when employers face a tension on the labour market.
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In this paper, we shall give an empirical analysis of matching 
processes in the labour market in Marseilles, France. Labour market is a 
two-sided market where agents belong to one of two disjoint sets : workers 
looking for a job and employers searching for applicants for the 
vacancy!ies) they are offering. A matching procedure try to match two agents 
of opposite sides so as to obtain a stable couple (worker,firm) where the 
worker is employed by the firm. There exist a wide literature on this topic 
and several matching procedures and algorithms have been implemented on 
several labour markets .
Employers and workers can meet each other in the labour market using 
several recruitment channels such as private or public employment agency, 
newspapers, personal acquaintances or employees referral, employers can also 
look for their labour force at some particular places such as colleges or 
public places, and workers can also present themselves to employers . We 
could expect that agents have a prior idea or a belief about the type of 
agent they could meet via each recruitment channel, and that their 
strategies against an agent met via a particular channel will vary according 
to the beliefs associated with this channel. We will call the effect of 
these beliefs on agents’ strategies a channel effect. We could also expect 
that agents will select the channels which promise to be the most fruitful 
for their purpose. However, by French law, firms should declare the jobs 
they are offering to the National Agency for Employment, (A.N.P.E., Agence 
Nationale Pour l’Emploi), which selects applicants in the file of unemployed 
people registered in the agency and presents them to employers. Therefore, 
employers face an institutional stream of applicants and their behaviour 
against these candidates will depend on the channel effect resulting from 
the ability of the agency to present acceptable candidates in regard to 
their requirements.
We have information on a sample of meetings organized by a local office 
in Marseilles of the National Agency of Employment. This agency was notified 
of a set of vacancies offered by 356 firms, and presents to these firms a 
set of 2492 workers. Each of these workers meet one or several employers, 
and each meeting ends with either an agreement, or a refusal, or a postponed 
decision. As we know some characteristics of both paired agents and the 
result of their meeting, we can try to explain this result by the available 
characteristics of the pair (applicant, employer). As the matching procedure 
is such that applicants are presented to employers, we 3can assume that the 
workers are rather willing to get the job they apply to . Hence the outcome 
of the meeting could be viewed as being mainly an employer’s decision.
The economic theory provides some elements to explain employers’ 
decision. Intuitively a firm would recruit a worker whose productivity is at 
least higher than a reservation level of productivity by analogy with the 
concept of reservation wage used in job-search theory. This reservation 
productivity could be defined as the level of productivity of an applicant
See Roth and Sotomayor for a detailed presentation of these models.
See Braudel (1979) for a historical survey of the meetings in the labour 
markets.
3Moreover the rate of unemployment in Marseilles is twice the national 
average, i.e around 20 per cent. This implies that applicants have a strong 





























































































such that the expected marginal income received by the firm after hiring 
this applicant is equal to the marginal cost of an additional period of time 
of search for another applicant. As this productivity is either unobservable 
or costly 4 to evaluate, employers will infer it from educational 
credentials , assuming that this productivity is positively correlated with 
the level of education because academic education is a profitable investment 
for only the most productive workers. If this inference is validated by the 
experience of previous job contracts, we obtain a signaling equilibrium 
which separates applicants in homogenous groups of productivity. However, 
the lowest qualified workers may also modify or conceal their real level of 
education bu£ we will assume that these strategic aspects of the information 
transmission have few importance in our case, though even such phenomena 
have been sometimes actually observed. Hence, we could expect that the 
result of a meeting will depend on applicant’s level of education.
Furthermore employers could also evaluate this productivity from 
applicant’s professional path such as previous job, professional training, 
or previous duration in unemployment : Blanchard and Diamond (1990) have 
proposed a model were employers infer this productivity using the duration 
of previous unemployment spells. Therefore we will also verify their impact 
on the result.
Besides employers could also6 infer this productivity from individual 
features such as age, gender, race , etc. However a decision founded on race 
and gender may also be relevant to discrimination phenomena.
Some empirical previous studies brought to the fore that employers’ 
search behaviour depends on the duration of the position and th^ skill 
required for it, the difficulty of firing a worker, or the wage rate : these 
variables have a positive effect either on the duration of the vacancy or on 
the number of screened applicants. We could expect that employers’ 
recruitment decision will also be influenced by these variables.
Finally, employers’ strategies could be influenced by the state of the 
market, in particular by the availability of likely applicants. Wolinsky 
(1987) proposed a theoretical model of matching and bargaining in which both 
sides of the market have the option of leaving their current bargaining 
partner and beginning bargaining with a new one. This has close relevance 
for the labour market. As Shaked and Sutton show, the availability of these 
outside options gives agents bargaining power. Therefore a high number of 
applicants for a position increase employers’ bargaining power. Conversely, 
the firm reduces this power by offering several identical positions. The 
ratio of the number of identical vacancies offered to the number of 
applicants encountered represents a tension on the labour market captured by 
the firm, and we could expect that this tension will have an effect on 
employers’s strategies.
This work is organized as follows. In section I we will present the 
matching procedure, the main interesting features of the data and the 
econometric model which we will use. Section II will be devoted to the 
validation of the effects presented above and the discussion of the 
estimation results.
See Spence (1973 and 1974), and Riley (1979). 
sSee Crawford and Sobel(1982), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), and Admati and 
Perry (1987).
See Spence (1974).






























































































I : The matching procedure, the data and the econometric model.
A : The matching procedure.
The initial move of the matching procedure is the decision of the firm 
to offer a vacancy on the market. This imply that the new job is not filled 
directly by internal promotion inside the firm, but is officially declared 
by the firm. The firm uses several recruiment networks such as acquaintances 
or informal recruitment channels, private unemployment agency, newspapers 
etc, but by French law it is enforced to declare also the job to the local 
office of the National Agency for Employment. Hence some administrative 
information are given to this office about the characteristics of the 
position and the profile of the requested applicants. On the basis of this 
information an administrator of the office chooses some applicants from the 
file of unemployed people registered in the agency. Besides this vacancy is 
also advertised on a notice board in the agency and the interested people 
should meet the administrator before applying. This means that the firm has 
no information about the available labour force and delegates to the agency 
the responsibility to choose the applicants. However selected applicants 
know the overall set of offered vacancies and their characteristics, but 
cannot apply without administrator’s approval. At this node of the 
description of the process, we should refer briefly to the existing matching 
mechanisms.
In the prevailing matching procedures in two sided-markets, agents of 
both side of the market have information about the agents of the other side 
and transmit their preferences over8 agents of the other side to a central 
institution which, using algorithms , matches the agents in a stable way, 
i.e. no pair of agent or no coalition of agents of both sides of the market 
are in a better position with a matching different from the one proposed by 
the matchmaker. The set of stable matchings coincides with the core of the 
matching game, i.e. the set of undominated outcomes. If the matchmaker is 
able to generate such stable matchings, no agent will have an incentive to 
look themselves for a partner of the other side of the market.
Hence, in our case firms will have an incentive to choose their workers 
to-be only through the Agency if the local office is able to propose such 
optimal matchings, which implies that the agency selects applicants taking 
into account the preferences of firms on the applicants. But it is not 
really the case. Only agency’s administrator knows the potential applicants 
and select or gives his approval to some of them on the basis of his opinion 
about their ability to obtain the position. This prior idea could be false 
if the administrator has no precise idea about the attributes and the 
content of the proposed position. Moreover, the National Agency for 
Employment is a governmental agency. If French government decides for some 
political reasons, such as the proximity of a poll, to promote a category of 
unemployed people (young entrants in the labour market, people with long 
unemployment duration, women, etc...), then it recommends the agency to give 
priority to these people. Therefore the selected applicants could be 
completely unacceptable in regard to employers’ requirements. Furthermore 
some suitable workers could have been discarded by this selection procedure.
The algorithms used for the matching problem use the properties of special 
graph structures called bipartite graphs. See Knuth (1976), Roth and 




























































































As employers and workers can use other channels to meet each other, the main 
consequence of a misal locat ion by the Agency is that employers will only 
formally declare the jobs to the agency, most of the hiring processes taking 
place outside the agency and perhaps before the vacancy was really 
advertised to the office. This really occurs in France where these tge 
National Agency represents only from 10% to 20% of the total recruitments . 
The consequence of this recommendation policy is a loss of credibility of 
the agency. In 1991, the National Agency for Employment decided to reverse 
this phenomenon, and administrators have to contact systematically employers 
in order to improve the screening quality of the agency.
Once this selection is performed, each selected applicant meets one or 
several employers until he is employed or he is not selected because there 
are no longer suitable positions for him in the sample. As the agency gave 
us most of the available information of both side of the market, i.e. the 
sample of all offered vacancies opposed to the selected sample of applicants 
and the result of the meeting, we can analyze quantitatively this process, 
being aware that we will model also the channel effect associated with the 
quality of the screening of the agency.
Now, let’s us present the main features of our data set.
B : The available data.
i : The vacancies : Our sample of vacancies has been offered by 356
firms from August 1987 to March 1988. Since some firms are offering several 
identical positions, our sample contains 440 vacancies. Each offered 
position is defined by a set of characteristics such as the offered wage in 
Francs per month (more precisely the minimum offered wage and sometimes the 
maximum offered wage which represent the lower and upper limit of the wage 
that employer is willing to pay), the type of job which is mainly a work 
contract or a temporary job for young entrants in the labour market. The 
former job is a usual traditional job with status, contract and conventional 
wage, right to social protection and unemployment insurance, thus a job 
recognized by people as a convenient occupation. The latter job, labelled 
SIVP is an initiative of the French Government in order to bring down the 
level of unemployment among young people. These temporary jobs (for three 
months) are intended for these people who are looking for a first job and 
hence are without professional experience, and are aimed to provide these 
young unemployed people with a professional experience enabling them to find 
a stable job more easily. We should also note that employers have financial 
incentives to offer these jobs, since the Government pays from 79% to 86% of 
the salary, and exempts employers from social charges (social insurance, 
social security) and fiscal charges. These jobs are subject to a prior 
agreement between the employer, the young worker and the administration in 
order to fix some professional objectives for this training period. 
Therefore, the worker to-be could be selected by the employer before the job 
is officially declared to the agency. There exist another jobs (mainly 
training jobs which are also subject to a trilateral agreement between an 
employer, an applicant and the administration) but they are few in 
comparison with the previous jobs. We also know the working time of the job,
50 % of the hirings take place via informal channels. As mentionned by van 
Ours (1990), these networks provide good initial screening of applicants and 




























































































(full-time or partial-time job), and the minimum level of education required 
by employers.
This level is split in four cases : level of "baccalauréat" which is 
the examination giving university entrance qualification, or level of middle 
school, or level of upper school, or level of "certificat d’études". These 
four categories are not very precise. There are several types of 
"baccalauréat" of which values are extremely different, the level of the 
"certificat d’études" means only that its owner is able to read and to write 
because this old diploma is quite no longer passed. Lastly the level of 
middle school or upper school are extremely heterogeneous, but correspond to 
a low scholarly background. In our sample less than 25 per cent of jobs 
require the highest level of education recorded, the majority of offered 
jobs need only the upper school level. We can deduce that most of the 
offered positions are not very qualified, and we could expect that the 
selected labour force will be little qualified. In any case, the used scale 
for the level of education is not suitable to a selection process intended 
for high qualified jobs.
Some other characteristics such as knowledge of foreign language, 
working travels, place of work etc, are also recorded. Most of these 
positions are offered in Marseilles. This labour market is local.
Finally employers request the agency to send them a minimum quota of 
applicants. We know also the number of applicants actually met. The main 
characteristics of these data are presented in tables 1,2 and 3 in appendix.
ü : The selected applicants. We know a lot of applicants’
characteristics. They include applicant’s name and surname, age, gender, 
marital status, the number of dependant children. In addition, we know the 
degree of priority (if the applicant is disabled or handicapped), his 
nationality (mainly French, but 8.5% of the sample has an Algerian, Tunisian 
or Moroccan nationality), the level of education, his professional 
qualification and professional path (reasons for the termination of previous 
job contract, previous job, number and duration of recorded unemployment 
spells, attendance on training courses) until the date of observation of the 
data (January 1989) if he remains unemployed. We observe that all the
selected applicants have a level of education at least equal to the one
requested by employers. This means that agency satisfies at least one of 
employers’ requirements. But this doesn’t imply that all the selected 
workers are acceptable by the firm because these requirements are not very 
precise. We know also if the applicant was directly selected by the agency.
Our sample contains a quite equal number of men and women. Most of
these applicants are young, with rather a low level of education, less than
10 per cent have a level greater than the "baccalauréat". Table 5 in 
appendix shows us that women have on average a better level of education 
than men : the distribution of the highest diplomas (Engineer, PhD, Graduate 
or Undergraduate and "baccalauréat") is in their favour . They are also more 
often observed among the population of highly skilled workers than men, but 
few of them have a professional qualification of manager, technician or 
supervisor, i.e. white collar workers. However our sample contains few white 
collar workers. The selected applicants have on average a low professional
With the restriction that diplomas with an identical label are extremely 
heterogenous. In France, the repartition of technical or scientific diplomas 




























































































qualification and are without professional experience. This is a consequence 
of both the high number of temporary job proposed (SIVP) which are intended 
for young people, and the structure of the offered vacancy which request on 
average a low level of education. Besides, high qualified people would 
prefer to use other recruitment channels such as private of public 
employment agency for white collar workers. We should note that the National 
Agency for Employment considers implicitly that this level is obsolete when 
applicants are older than 30 years because it is not recorded in this case. 
(See main details in appendix, tables 4,5,6,7 and 8).
iii : The meetings : Once an applicant is selected, he meets the 
employer offering the position. The result of this meeting is either an 
agreement, i.e the employer is hired, or a refusal, or a postponed decision, 
i.e. the final decision will be made later. If the applicant is not offered 
the job, he may have the opportunity to meet another employer if he is 
selected again. The following table gives us the distribution of the 
meetings in our sample of 2492 applicants.
Number of employers met.
Number of 
appiicants
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13
1856 428 111 57 18 8 3 6 3 1 1
As it is shown in this table the majority of applicants meet only one 
employers, a few of them have the opportunity to be selected for more than 
three vacancies.
We know also the chronological order of each meeting and the 
observation of the results following this order shows us that only 164 
workers are hired after their first interview, 2 after their second one, the 
remainder applicants stay unemployed though even they have had the 
opportunity to meet several potential employers. The path of the selected 
applicants until the date of observation show us that no applicant who had 
faced a deferred decision was employed. Then we can the deduce that a 
postponed decision is a polite refusal. We can conclude from this first 
result that the exit from unemployment is extremely brutal for the selected 
applicants, either they exit immediately from unemployment or they remain 
unemployed.
This result doesn’t imply that only 166 jobs are actually filled, since 
applicants from another recruitment channels can be employed. This small 
number of success may be a consequence of the above mentioned bad reputation 
of the matching procedure implemented by the agency which could prejudice 
applicants who try to get a position through it. They could be considered as 
people unable to find an occupation themselves or to establish a personnal 
network so as to get a job.
As the repetition of meetings doesn’t change his chance of being hired, 




























































































about his ability to obtain a job. As we want to explain the probability of 
each possible result, we will therefore retain in our analysis only the 
first meeting of each applicant, thus our sample will contain these 2492 
first meetings.
C : The econometric model.
Our aim is to explain each of these observable results by the available 
characteristics of each couple of agents (employers,workers) paired by the 
National Agency for Employment. Since this result is a discrete event, we 
can represent it by a polychotomic variable and we model the probability of 
realization of these three possible results using qualitative variable 
models such as a multinomial logit or a nested logit model. These models 
differ on the hypothesis of independence between the possible results. If we 
consider that they are independent, we use a multinomial logit model. The 
observation of the results of our matching process suggests us that two of 
the possible events, i.e. a refusal or a postponed decision, are close, and 
this feature leads us to the choice of a nested logit model, where these two 
events will be assumed to be correlated.
We will follow a two step method proposed by Amemiya and Shimono (1989) 
which amounts to a decomposition of the joint probability of all the events 
in marginal and conditional probabilities which will be estimated using 
simple binomial logit models.
In a first step, we define the sub-sample of the observations X. which
do not end with an agreement, and we note this sub-sample by NA. A deferred 
decision is an event conditional on the event that no agreement has 
occurred, and we write the probability of this event as follows :
P Deferred decision 1 + exp "Xi*i € NA,
where p is an association parameter or dissimilarity parameter, which
should belong to the interval ] 0,1 ], such that the correlation between the
2events deferred decision and refusal is equal to 1-p (Amemiya 1985).
We can express this probability under the form of a logistic function A 
by multiplying the numerator and the denominator by the quantity expfX^),
and we obtain the following equality :
P Deferred decis 1 r xipi ilonJ = A [ —  J- Xt e NA.
We estimate this model on the sub-sample NA and we get an estimate
We use this obtained value for the second step of estimation, where we 
compute the probability of the event "agreement" which is a marginal 




























































































r f  r r iP Agreement = 1  +  exp(-X1P0) e x p —  J
identify with a logit model, and we obtain :
r  ^ r r x i ^ i  i 1
P Agreement =  A V o  -  p  l 0 8 [  e x P [  - J -  J + 1 j
that we
We estimate this latter model on the complete 
of the previous step that we transform so as
explanatory variable log £ exp(X. — j )+ 1 j.
sample using the estimate 
to obtain an additional
Next we insert this variable in the latter model 1]and we estimate by 
maximization of its likelihood the parameters /3Q and p We complete this
account by giving a measure of the effect of the variation of the two 
variables, these quantities will then allow us to refine the interpretation 
of their effects.
We estimated concurrently a standard multinomial logit model. The choice of 
the nested logit model was founded on two criteria. We compared the log 
likelihood of both models assuming that the the model with the highest value 
has the better fit to the data. A second possibility is to use a criteria 
proposed by Cox (1962) and generalized by Vuong and Rivers (1990). Let Mf
and be two competing models, i.e. respectively the nested logit model and 
the multinomial logit model, and be the respective parameters of 
interest of these models, and y£ and yg be the estimated values of these 
parameters. Let f be the density of Mf and g be the density of If we
assume that our sample is of size n, and is independent and identically 
distributed we define the statistic noted by Tn as follows :
[ ' - I
n
E  log f ( X j ,r f )/ «(X , , y g )
L n J i =1
1I  E log ff(X1,yf)/g(X1,rg)ì- 1 I log f/"(Xj,yf )/g(X.. yg )
J n j = 1 ^
Next we define the size a of the test and the critical values z . and -z .a/2 a/2
for a standard Normal distribution. If the statistic Tn belongs to the
interval _̂za/2’za/2] two moclels are asymptotically equivalents, if
T <-z , then M. is asymptotically better than M , if T >z . then M is 
n a / 2  f  * *  J  g n a / 2  g




























































































II : The results.
Our main objective is to explain the result of each meeting, which we 
assumed to be mainly an employers’ decision, by applicants characteristics 
employers characteristics and the tension on the labour market. We extract 
from our data set the explanatory variables and sometimes we transform and 
combine some available data so as to obtain these explanatory variables.
We wish to detect first the effect of some applicant’s characteristics 
which could be interpreted as a signal about his productivity. The first 
characteristic is applicant’s level of education. We could assume that this 
level has a threshold effect such that an employer hires an applicant only 
if his level of education is higher than a threshold. Unfortunately this 
threshold is not declared. We know only that it is surely higher than the 
requirement communicated to the agency because all the selected applicants 
should fulfill this condition. Nevertheless, we can more or less determine 
if applicant’s level is greater than this threshold. In a first step we 
approximate this threshold through the following reasoning : if a worker is 
hired, this imply that his level of education is greater than this unknown 
hurdle that we can approximate as the lowest element of the set of the level 
of education of all the applicants that have been hired for the job. Once 
this threshold estimated, we construct for each worker a dichotomous 
variable, which we note LEGH, and this variable is equal to one if worker’s 
level of education is greater than this hurdle and zero otherwise. And if no 
worker is hired, the level of education of each applicant is necessarily 
lower than the unknown threshold, thus LEGH is equal to zero.
We proceed the same way for deferred decisions. We also assume that an 
employer’s choice between a refusal or a deferred decision is made on the 
basis of a threshold. As previously, we estimate this level by the lowest 
level of education among the applicants who receive a deferred decision. 
Then, we define another variable called LINT which indicates that 
applicant’s level of education is greater than this threshold and lower than 
the previous one linked to agreements. These variables allow us to reveal 
screening effects among workers on the basis of the level of education. Each 
threshold of level of education would be associated with a decision, 
regardless of the job remains vacant or is filled otherwise. These 
thresholds determine if an applicant is acceptable or almost acceptable.
The professional background of an applicant may also provide an 
employer with a belief on worker’s abilities. The lack of professional 
experience could prejudice the employer against applicants who are lacking 
in experience or whose previous occupation is not well defined ( this means 
that it that cannot be referenced by the two digit number which codifies the 
set of previous activities). Hence we set up the variable FRSJ which 
indicates that the applicant is looking for a first job, and the variable 
INDE which indicates that applicant’s last position cannot be referenced. 
Moreover, the professional qualification can help employers to evaluate an 
applicant. Then we will also use two dichotomous variables which represent a 
high professional skill or a low professional skill. The reference group is 
unskilled applicants.
The worker’s previous position towards unemployment may also supply an 
employer with an idea about his working abilities. Several studies bring out 
the effect of bad reputation associated with long unemployment spells, even 
if Jackman and Layard (1991) found no evidence about the hypothesis of state 
dependence in unemployment. Then we will estimate these phenomena using the 
number of previous unemployment spells recorded by the agency from the date 




























































































applicants were questioned about their previous positions during the 
recruitment interview. The employers can know directly or infer this number 
of unemployment spells from applicant’s declarations.
In order to check discrimination between applicants, we use some 
observable individual features such as age, gender, marital status and name. 
We expect that age has a negative effect since this variable is synonymous 
with a loss of working abilities. Inclusion of gender will allows us to 
detect gender discrimination. Marital status is less straightforward to 
interpret. It represents an adhesion to a social norm, and also influences 
people behaviour in the labour market. Kooreman (1988) showed that a married 
person whose spouse is working has less incentive to participate in the 
labour force. Besides an employer’s response to applicant’s marital status 
is unpredictable. Then we will examine the effect of the characteristics 
’single’ and ’spouse working or registered unemployed’ on the result of the 
match.
We use applicant’s name on the basis of a local feature. At the end of 
the sixties French firms offered positions to workers from North Africa in 
order to cut the inflation of salary costs in France. This policy got the 
approval of French government after some internal discussions, but no 
insertion policy , i.e. educational and social program int^ded to the 
migrants, has been implemented for managing this migratory flow . Therefore 
we observed quickly the two consequences of this political failure : a low 
professional qualification and social insertion of these people and a strong 
prejudice against them .
We will consider an applicant as of North-African extraction if both 
his name and surname indicate a North-African origin. We group together not 
only applicants with an Algerian, Tunisian or Moroccan nationality, who 
represent only 8.5% of our sample, but also French citizens. The dichotomous 
variable NAPT which represents these people will allow us to test for the 
existence of the above mentioned phenomena. Discrimination phenomena have 
been studied by Spence (1974) within a model where an employer observes 
different levels of education between colored and white people, infers on 
this basis different levels of productivity and offers different wages to 
the two groups of individuals.
Lastly, several studies on employers’ recruitment behaviour (Beaumont 
1978) showed that employers hire more willingly an applicant for a low paid 
position than for a high paid position. Therefore we will verify if 
employers’ decision depend on the wage they are offering. We could also 
expect that this decision will be influenced by the tension on the labour 
market captured by their vacancies. This tension will be measured by the 
ratio of the number of offered jobs to the number of applicants encountered 
via the agency : the greater this ratio, the higher the tension generated by 
the flow of vacancies offered by the firm. In this case, the firm will be 
more willing to hire one of the rare applicants met. Conversely, if this
The causes of this migration were caused by economic reasons after the end 
of the seventies.
13A political party, which claims explicitly for expulsion of North-African 
people if they are foreigner or the reconsideration of their French 
nationality, represents between 20% and 30% of the voters in Marseilles. 
This rejection is reinforced by the degradation of the economic situation in 




























































































ratio is low, the choice set of the firm is enlarged, and the individual 
probability for an applicant of being hired is reduced.
The following table shows us the means of the explanatory variables.
Variables : Definition Mean
AGE : Age of applicant 26.992
•14MAN The applicant is a man 0. 496
SGLE : Single 0.816
MACT : Married, spouse working or registered unemployed 0.099
NAPT : North-African name and surname 0.279
NBUP : Number of previous unemployment spells 2.756
FRSJ : Looking for a first job 0.427
HQUAL* Highly qualified workers (White collar, 0.557
LQUAL*
skilled and highly skilled worker, skilled employees) 
Low qualified workers (Unskilled worker, blue collar, 0.436
LEGH*:
unskilled employees)
Level of education greater than the higher threshold 0. 264
LINT : Level of education between the two threshold 0.085
TENS : Tension on the labour market 0. 103
MINW : Minimum offered wage in French francs. 3900FF
B : The estimation results.
^  presented here the obtained estimation results of the nested logit 
model , with their T-statistic, and their mean and maximum effects. The 
estimation of the marginal model which explains the probability of the event 
’agreement’ provides us with the following results :
* : The variable is dichotomous.
15
We estimated concurrently a multinomial logit model and a nested logit 
model. The respective values of the log likelihood function are equal to 
-769.7462 and -763.1939. It appears that the nested logit model has the 
better fit with the data. However, Cox’s statistics is equal to -1.81 and 
belongs to the interval [-1.96 , 1.96] for a test of size equal to 5% and
leads us to conclude that both models are asymptotically equivalents. 
However this statistic would lead us to conclude to an asymptotical 
superiority of the nested logit model for a test of size equal to 7%. 





























































































Log-1 ike1ihood function : -445 753
Variable Coefficient t stat Mean effect Max effect
AGE 0.7839e-l 4.63 0.0042 0.0195
MAN 0.3264 1.58 0.0174 0.0813
SGLE (Single) -0.7829 -2.33 -0.0489 -0.1926
MACT (Married, spouse working -0.5035 -1. 18 *** ***
or registered unemployed)
NAPT (North-African name) -0.8224 -3.67 -0.0393 -0.2027
NBUP (Number of previous -0.1327 -2.94 -0.0071 -0.0331
unemployment spells)
FRSJ (Looking for a first job) 0.6614e-l 0. 13 * ** * **
UNSP (Previous job unknown) -0.9768 -2.02 -0.0468 -0.2391
HQUAL (highly skilled worker) -4.8554 -8.07 -0.3704 -0.8378
LQUAL (low qualified worker) -4.7213 -7.88 -0.2566 -0.8275
LEGH (Level of education 3.5725 11.43 0.2513 0.7129
greater than highest hurdle)
LINT (Level of education -9.2882 -0.03 *** ***
between the two hurdles)
MINW (Minimum offered wage) -0.115e-3 -1.59 -6.203e-6 -2.87e-5
TENS (Tension on the labour 1.2598 3. 84 0.0678 0.3149
market)
p (Dissimilarity parameter) 2.3709 4.26
*** : The variable is non significantly different from zero.
The conditional model which explains the probability of the event 
’deferred decision’ conditional on the event ’no agreement takes place’ 





























































































Log-1 ike1ihood function : -317.440
Variable Coefficient t stat Mean effect Max effect
AGE 0.5339e-l 3.47 0.0020 0.0195
MAN 0.9356 3.57 0.0357 0.2283
SGLE (Single) -1.3653 -4.21 -0.0701 -0.3286
MACT (Married, spouse working -1.3591 -2.61 -0.0370 -0.3272
or registered unemployed)
NAPT (North-African name) -0.6919 -2. 48 -0.0237 -0.1710
NBUP (Number of previous -0.1701 -2.82 -0.0065 -0.0425
unemployment spells)
FRSJ (Looking for a first job) -0.8627 -1.83 -0.0288 -0.2123
UNSP (Previous job unknown) 0.1764e-l 0. 04 *** ***
HQUAL (highly skilled worker) -3.8990 -6. 91 -0.2666 -0.7507
LQUAL (low ski led worker) -3.8443 -7.06 -0.1961 -0.7447
LEGH (Level of education 1.8394 5. 52 0.0938 0.4299
greater than highest hurdle)
LINT (Level of education 3.8998 11.37 0.3777 0.7508
between the two hurdles)
MINW (Minimum offered wage) -0.220e-3 -2. 16 -8.467e-6 -5.S0e-5
TENS (Tension on the labour 0.5357 1.43 0.0206 0.1339
market)
An acceptation depends mainly on applicant’s level of education. The 
variable LEGH has the strongest positive effect on the probability of an 
agreement (25 %). We observe a more important effect of the variable LINT 
(37%) on a deferred decision and a non negligible effect of the variable 
LEGH (9%) on the same event. We observe then a screening mechanism on the 
basis of applicants’ level of education which validates our assumption about 
the threshold effect of the level of education an employer fix two 
thresholds. If the applicant’s level of education is below the lowest one, 
he is considered as unacceptable and is declined, if his level is between 
the two hurdles, he faces a deferred decision, and finally if his level is 
greater than the highest hurdle then he is (more likely ) employed or faces 




























































































of education is certainly a consequence of the channel effect associated 
with the screening quality of the agency. Employers meet concurrently 
applicants presented by informal networks, of which screening is good, and 
candidates selected by the agency who have no external and reliable referee 
about their suitability. Therefore employers considers that applicants’ 
educational credentials are the only reliable information. This result 
extends Riley’s result (1979) where employers use these credentials when 
applicants’ productivity is costly to evaluate. Firms use also this signal 
when the screening quality of the recruitment charme1 is doubtful.
Beyond the level of education, employers scrutinize the past history of 
applicants towards labour market.
The two variables which represent applicant’s professional skills have 
a negative effect on the probabilities of an agreement or a deferred 
decision. These negative effects mean that workers with some professional 
skills are disadvantaged in comparison with workers without specific 
qualifications. A too high reservation wage of the skilled applicants could 
explain this result. More plausible is the interpretation with regard to the 
channel effect. We can assume that labour market is segmented in two groups 
of positions. A first group contains jobs intended for applicants with some 
professional skills. Firms prefer to hire on these jobs applicants coming 
from informal or internal recruitment channels because they have some 
confidence about the suitability of these applicants. The second group 
contains positions which do not need professional skills. These jobs could 
be viewed as an entry into the firm. For these positions, firms do not give 
precedence to a particular recruitment channel, thus applicants selected by 
the agency have a good opportunity of being employed.
The negative effect of the offered wage on an agreement and a deferred 
decision confirms this duality and the bad reputation stuck to the 
applicants selected by the agency. A high wage is the corollary of a high 
qualification requirement, and this latter result emphasizes that employers 
give precedence to the applicants coming from the other recruitment channels 
for the highest qualified positions.
The variable FRSJ which indicates that applicant is a newcomer in the 
labour market has no significant effect on an agreement and has a negative 
role on a deferred decision. This means that workers who are looking for a 
first job are disadvantaged in comparison with workers with professional 
experience. This result is reinforced by the negative effect of the variable 
UNSP which indicates that applicant’s previous activity is unspecified. Its 
negative effect on the probability of an agreement underlines the advantage 
supplied with a recognized professional activity. Besides, the variable NBUP 
shows us that the larger are the number of previous unemployment spells, the 
lower is the probability of being hired. An employer can interpret a large 
number of unemployment spells as a professional instability, or as a low 
productivity, or as an insufficient insertion into the labour market. 
Robinson (1988) pointed out that- the "long term unemployed people performed 
very badly during their interview, appearing anxious and depressed" 
Therefore employers may prefer to recruit applicants making a better 
impression.




























































































Some individual characteristics, not directly connected to the working 
abilities, have also an impact on the result of the meeting.
Age has a linear positive effect on an agreement and on a deferred 
decision. This refutes the usual assumption about the unfavorable effects of 
this feature, which may be associated with a loss of abilities. We can 
explain this result observing age distribution in our sample : more than 
half of applicants are 25 years old or younger. Then age may be synonymous 
with experience. Therefore, the youp^est applicants will be in a 
disadvantageous position to obtain a job . Nevertheless we observe that the 
mean and the maximum effects of this variable are minor.
Being a man has a low significant but positive effect on the 
probability of an agreement, and has a positive effect on the probability of 
a deferred decision. This result reflects either employers’ discriminative 
behaviour against women or the fact that gender may proxy other unobservable 
characteristics. The former discriminative behaviour is already known in the 
literature. Cabral, Ferber and Green (1981), Lazear and Rozen (1990) as well 
as Renes and Ridder (1990) found that women are put at an unfair 
disadvantage with respect to men for obtaining a job. Apparently employers 
assume that women may exit from the labor market for other activities, and 
therefore they prefer to hire men assuming that they will constitute a more 
stable labour force. Such discrimination is a new aspect of an old 
phenomenon in which employers pay a lower wage to a woman than to a man who 
owns the same abilities (Cain 1986). Since French law forbids this type of 
discrimination, employers hire less likely a woman, and replace wage 
adjustment by labour force substitution.
Gender may also proxy applicants’ unobserved features. We saw above 
that applicant’s level of education plays a strong role in employers’ 
decision. When we constructed the variable representing the effect of the 
level of education, we implicitly assumed that diplomas with the same label 
(baccalauréat, upper school,...) are homogeneous. In the first part, we 
mentioned that they are extremely heterogeneous, in particular women have on 
average less scientific or technical diplomas than men. As these latter 
educational credentials are the most appreciated on the labour market, 
employers will give precedence to men rather to women, in accordance with 
Spence’s model (1974).
Furthermore this result may also be the consequence of a failure of the 
selection process made by the agency. If administrators, following political 
directives, selected unemployed women whereas the vacancy is not suitable 
for them (for example building sector employs exclusively men), the selected 
women will be surely declined.
Marital status has no effect on the probability of an agreement. On the 
other hand, being single or having a spouse who is working has a positive 
effect on refusal. We can suppose that a job seeker whose spouse is working 
may be less willing to accept a job : the presence of the spouse’s wage may 
have a countei— incentive effect on labor force participation like an 
unemployment benefit (Kooreman 1988). On the other hand, the interpretation 
of the signal ’to be single’ is less straightforward : it may be interpreted 
by the employer as a feature of instability, or of independence.
We observe a significant negative effect of a North-African name and




























































































surname on the probability of an agreement. Since the market appears to be a 
supply side market, this feature seems to result either from a 
discrimination among workers on the basis of their racial origin, or from a 
consequence on their bad insertion in the French society : a North-African 
extraction could be synonymous with unobservable characteristics such that 
their owner is considered as unacceptable by firms. Although we should 
temper this result with the way we used to construct the variable NAPT, this 
effect is without ambiguity : the mean effect of this feature is a change of 
4 percent and 2.4 percent on respectively the probability of an agreement 
and the the probability of a deferred decision. This effect is equal to 
twice the mean effect of gender selection for an agreement.
However, the strength of the selection is alleviated when employers are 
subject to labour force constraints. The variable TENS, which measures a 
tension on the labour market where the firm is acting, has a positive effect 
on an agreement but no impact on a deferred decision. Employers seem to be 
more willing to hire one of the rare applicant met when they have trouble to 
find potential candidates.
Lastly, we observe that the estimated value of the association 
parameter p is equal to 2.37 and is outside the theoretical interval ]0,1] 
into which this parameter must belong. These theoretical constraints are 
often violated in empirical analysis .
Conclusion.
In conclusion, we observe a strong segmentation of this labour market 
in two regimes. The key to this phenomenon is the level of education 
obtained from the French system of education. A small part of applicants 
whose level of education is considered to be high enough by employers are 
hired after their first meeting. Applicant’s educational credentials are 
used by employers as a screening device because the national agency for 
employment is not sufficiently reliable for screening acceptable candidates. 
The rest of applicants, i.e. young people without experience or job seekers 
without recognized professional past are immediately declined, or receive a 
postponed decision which ends with a refusal. These latter job seekers have 
trouble to exit from unemployment or to find a first job. For Merle and 
Vandepotte (1980) these applicants are rejected at best to precarious or 
temporary jobs, and at worst to long duration unemployment. This screening 
mechanism is rigourous accordingly with the level of wage. Nevertheless, the 
strength of this selection is alleviated when employers face a tension in 
the labour market, i.e. when the labour requested is scarce.
We observe also that women and people of North- African extraction are 
disadvantaged in comparison with other applicants. These facts may result
Amemiya and Shimono (1989) as well as Borsch-Supan (1987) faced the same 
problem. The main consequence of this value is that the probabilities of the 
events "agreement" and "deferred decision" are computed with an improper 
integral, and we cannot interpret the result of the nested logit model by a 




























































































from a discriminative attitude of employers. Gender discrimination is well 
known in the literature. The difficulties of North-African people go beyond 
the labour market, and encompasses both political and sociological aspects. 
Nevertheless, this result may also be a consequence of a lack of technical 
training of these applicants.
We mentioned above that the weight of educational references was caused 
by the doubtful screening of the agency which induces a channel effect. If 
the main target of the agency is being an efficient matchmaker, it has 
certainly to revise its matching procedure and to adopt the ones implemented 
in other specific labour markets so as not to penalize the suitable 
applicants who will use the channel of the agency. Conversely, if the agency 
has to insert in the professional life people disadvantaged towards 
employment, it should implement some serious training formations so as to 
transform these unemployed people as applicants acceptable for the firms. 
For those who are unable to follow this training, some social distributive 
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Table 1 : Characteristics of the vacancies Filledvacancies
Offered
vacancies
SIVP contacts (temporary positions) 87 (52.4%) 174 (39.5%)
Work contract (with social insurance, etc.) 75 (45.2%) 250 (56.8%)
Others contracts 4 (2.4%) 16 (3.6%)
Full time contract with undetermined duration 44 (26.5%) 167 (40%)
Partial time contract with undetermined duration 9 (5.5%) 23 (5.2%)
Contracts with fixed duration less than 3 months 84 (50.6%) 181 (41.1%)
Contracts with fixed duration greater than 3 months 29 (17.4%) 68 (15.4%)
Contracts requiring the level of "baccalauréat" 21 (12.6%) 73 (16.6%)
Contracts requiring the "certificat d’études" 12 (7.2%) IS (3.4%)
Contracts requiring the middle school level 20 (12%) 57 (13%)
Contracts requiring the upper school level 113 (68%) 295 (67%)
Contracts requiring some particular knowledge 42 (25.3%) 110 (25%)
Contracts requiring a professional experience 71 (42.7%) 235 (53%)
Table 2 : Level of education 
required by SIVP and work contracts SIVP Work contract *
Level of "baccalauréat" 18 52
Level of upper school 107 180
Level of middle school 39 17
Level of "certificat d’études" 10 2
Table 3 Mean St-Dev Minimum Maximum
Working time (hours/week) : 37.08 6.63 4 39
Number of paid months : 12.006 0.077 12 13
Minimum offered wage : 3531 1536.4 464 7705
Maximum offered wage : 3814.6 1456.9 464 8000
Mean offered wage : 3225.3 1053 2500 8000
Number of requested applicants : 14.8 17. 1 1 99




























































































Table 4 : Age of applicants Men Women Total
25 years and younger : 603 775 1378
between 26 and 35 years : 374 330 704
between 36 and 55 years : 249 141 390
more than 55 years : 12 8 20
Total : 1238 1254 2492
Table 5 : Level of education Men Women Total
Ph D, Graduate, Final Honours, Engineer : 3 4 7
First and second year at the University : 8 6 14
Baccalaureat : 82 137 219
Upper School : 340 433 773
Middle School : 261 255 516
Primary Living certificate : 200 194 394
30 years and older*: 344 225 569
* The national agency for Unemployment considers that the academic 
background is obsolete after 30 years.
Table 6 : Professional qualification Men Women Total
Unprecise : 60 18 78
Unskilled worker (manœuvre) : 202 107 309
Semiskilled worker (ouvrier spécialisé) : 313 71 384
Skilled workman (ouvrier qualifié) : 172 19 191
Highly Skilled worker : 228 476 704
(ouvrier hautement qualifié)
Unskilled Employee : 235 552 787
Skilled Employee : 17 9 26
Manager, Technician, Supervisor 12 1 13




























































































Table 7 : Reasons for termination of 
the previous job contract.
Men Women Total
Layoff : 283 191 474
Resignation : 61 61 122
End of job contract : 440 502 942
End of interim job : 44 20 64
Looking for a first job : 249 346 595
Return to the labor market : 119 95 214
Others cases : 42 39 81
Table 8 : Previous branch of industry Men Women Total
Unprecise Activity : 336 432 768
Industry : 308 172 480
Trade : 242 215 457
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